The book The Untold History of the United States has been a fascinating, aggravating
and equally offending. A book that has kept me avoiding it as much as I have
read. Thankfully it’s an easy read. Looking back through the at this semesters
readings I feel there are two topics that I feel require an extra look; atomic
weapons after the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and one that wasn’t in the
book but inspired mush discussion in class which was the completion of the
interstate highway system inside the city of Baltimore.
Potential use of Atomic Weapons
over Baltimore
In my previous blog Truman’s
Options I made the point for the use of the atomic bombs versus Japan. I
stated the book The Untold History
of the Unites States would have you believe that no other option was never
even thought of. The book goes so far as to say that certain high-ranking
officers in the U.S. military even opposed the bomb and everything the bomb
stood for. General MacArthur was quoted as saying that the bomb was “completely
unnecessary from a military point of view”. (Kuznick n.d.) MacArthur was in the
field and wasn’t in on any other strategies or plans after the war. The book
goes onto mention how Truman became joyful when he learned the test was a
success. It also says “ a revolver made all men 6 foot tall, the successful
atomic bomb test made the diminutive Truman a giant who towered over the worlds
most fearsome dictators”. (Kuznick n.d.) The book basically makes Truman
out to be a man who had this new toy and couldn’t wait to use it. What I would
like to remind this book is that we can look back now, almost 70 years later,
and say we’ll we didn’t have to drop the bomb. That’s true but like any bad
situation you’re in, you don’t know just how it will end. To this day I feel that
the decision to drop it was the right one. What the book doesn’t do though is
offer any of the other options that Truman and his staff had available to him
at that time. So I thought I would research and see what some of the other
options were. I even looked at the work of Nathan Donohue who has already done
this for us and here are the options that Truman had available, pros and cons,
for using the bomb that the book didn’t show:
“Ending the
war at the earliest possible moment - The primary objective for the U.S. was to win the war at the lowest
possible cost. Specifically, Truman was looking for the most effective way to
end the war quickly, not for a way to not use the bomb.
To justify the
cost of the Manhattan Project
- The Manhattan Project was a secret program to which the U.S. had funneled an
estimated $1,889,604,000
(in 1945 dollars) through December 31, 1945.
To impress the
Soviets - With the end of
the war nearing, the Soviets were an important strategic consideration,
especially with their military control over most of Eastern Europe. As Yale
Professor Gaddis Smith has noted,
“It has been demonstrated that the decision to bomb Japan was centrally
connected to Truman's confrontational approach to the Soviet Union.” However,
this idea is thought to be more appropriately understood as an ancillary
benefit of dropping the bomb and not so much its sole purpose.
A lack of
incentives not to use the bomb - Weapons were created to be used. By 1945, the bombing of civilians was
already an established practice. In fact, the earlier U.S. firebombing campaign
of Japan, which began in 1944, killed an estimated 315,922
Japanese, a greater number than the estimated deaths attributed to the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The firebombing of Tokyo alone resulted in
roughly 100,000
Japanese killed.
Responding to
Pearl Harbor - When a
general raised objections to the use of the bombs, Truman responded by noting
the atrocities of Pearl Harbor and said that “When you have to deal with a
beast you have to treat him as a beast.”” (Donohue 2012)
(Credit: Center
for Strategic & International Studies)
Donohue then goes
onto inform us of the cons that Truman and his staff had to consider:
“Intensifying
conventional bombing and the naval blockade - General MacArthur felt that air power alone could force a Japanese
surrender within six months with little risk to American lives. However, it was
also argued that this might be a best-case scenario where in actuality it could
take substantially longer.
Allowing the
Japanese to retain the Emperor - This plan was predicated on mitigating the call for unconditional
surrender by Japan. Both Secretary of War Stimson and Acting Secretary of State
Grew felt that this was an essential policy because of the dedication and
fanaticism of the Japanese people towards the Emperor Hirohito, whom the
Japanese believed to be a deity.
Waiting for the Soviet Union to enter the war - This had been a primary objective of President
Roosevelt in his negotiations with the Soviet Union at the Yalta Conference.
Nevertheless, the Committee believed that a Soviet invasion of Manchuria would
be helpful but not decisive by itself.” (Donohue 2012)
But what
about life after the use of atomic weapons in a place we call home? Would we
survive? For the sake of my argument and topic, we all live at 1420 North
Charles Street Baltimore,MD and Japan was to detonate an Atomic bomb at the
intersection of Light and Pratt Streets. Since I’m not a nuclear physics my
preliminary answer would be…maybe but you wouldn’t be unscathed. The Federation
of American Scientists have already studied some of the potential effects and
here are a few of their findings
Air Bursts. An airburst is an explosion in which a
weapon is detonated in air at an altitude below 30 km but at sufficient height
that the fireball does not contact the surface of the earth. After such a
burst, blast may cause considerable damage and injury. The altitude of an airburst
can be varied to obtain maximum blast effects, maximum thermal effects, desired
radiation effects, or a balanced combination of these effects. Burns to exposed
skin may be produced over many square kilometers and eye injuries over a still
larger area. Initial nuclear radiation will be a significant hazard with
smaller weapons, but the fallout hazard can be ignored as there is essentially
no local fallout from an air burst. The fission products are generally
dispersed over a large area of the globe unless there is local rainfall
resulting in localized fallout. In the vicinity of ground zero, there may be a
small area of neutron-induced activity, which could be hazardous to troops
required to pass through the area. Tactically, air bursts are the most likely
to be used against ground forces.
Credit: FAS
Surface Burst. A surface burst is an explosion in which a
weapon is detonated on or slightly above the surface of the earth so that the
fireball actually touches the land or water surface. Under these conditions,
the area affected by blast, thermal radiation, and initial nuclear radiation
will be less extensive than for an air burst of similar yield, except in the
region of ground zero where destruction is concentrated. In contrast with air
bursts, local fallout can be a hazard over a much larger downwind area than
that which is affected by blast and thermal radiation.
Subsurface
Burst. A subsurface burst
is an explosion in which the point of the detonation is beneath the surface of
land or water. Cratering will generally result from an underground burst, just
as for a surface burst. If the burst does not penetrate the surface, the only
other hazard will be from ground or water shock. If the burst is shallow enough
to penetrate the surface, blast, thermal, and initial nuclear radiation effects
will be present, but will be less than for a surface burst of comparable yield.
Local fallout will be very heavy if penetration occurs.
High Altitude
Burst. A high altitude
burst is one in which the weapon is exploded at such an altitude (above 30 km)
that initial soft x-rays generated by the detonation dissipate energy as heat
in a much larger volume of air molecules. There the fireball is much larger and
expands much more rapidly. The ionizing radiation from the high altitude burst
can travel for hundreds of miles before being absorbed. Significant ionization
of the upper atmosphere (ionosphere) can occur. Severe disruption in
communications can occur following high altitude bursts. They also lead to
generation of an intense electromagnetic pulse (EMP), which can significantly
degrade performance of or destroy sophisticated electronic equipment. There are
no known biological effects of EMP; however, indirect effects may result from
failure of critical medical equipment.
Credit : FAS http://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/effects.htm
With that being said I feel that the effects of a blast of
even a small nuclear weapon in Baltimore would make the survival alone hard.
Factoring in the environment, social, economic, psychological and political
scene would make the city uninhabitable for years to come.
Baltimore Interstate
System
This topic was brought up in class and there was a heated
discussion that followed. Should we have built it or be thankful we didn’t?
Each side was louder than the other. Well I am on the side that we should have
built at least the I-70 portion as long
as we also built the Red Line and kept the trolley system.
In my career I have always had engineering jobs that require
me to travel daily. For a week I might be in Silver Spring and the net week I
might be in Parkton. Every week day, morning and night, I have to drive and
fight traffic and it gets annoying. The opening of the ICC brought some relief
to my commute but would it have been made even better by the completion of
I-70? I don’t know. Now as I type this I am reminded of my hatred for my car
and my jealousy for New York City. Don’t get me wrong but as much as I love my
car, the freedom it provides and the ability to get myself where I want to go
whenever, I would prefer to live in a place where mass transit was accepted. A
place where I could ride from Hunt Valley to Columbia to White Marsh if I desired
on rails.
While there is little to no evidence of any scholarly work
done on the subject, David W. Barton, Jr. gives us a little background on the
interstate highway debacle of the 60’s and 70’s in Baltimore. He states “in the
1960s, Baltimore neighborhoods like Mt. Vernon, Federal Hill, and Fells Point
were all in danger of serious disfigurement in the name of the Interstate
Highway system. Among other strategies, highway planners were proposing
to level Federal Hill, build an elevated highway along the Fells Point and
Canton waterfronts, and “enhancing” the experience of the Washington Monument
by creating a highway scenic loop around Mt. Vernon place.
Baltimoreans worked together to rescue the city from this
potential fate. Join us as we welcome David W Barton, Jr., Chairman of
Baltimore City Planning Commission during that crucial period. Mr. Barton
will be BAF’s first informal Brown Bag speaker. Mr. Barton helped lead
local efforts that were ultimately successful in preserving the character of
our historic communities surrounding the downtown business district.
During the 60s Mr. Barton was also Chairman of the Baltimore Regional Planning
Commission, a member of the 5th District Federal Reserve Board (MD, VA, WV,
NC), creator of Baltimore Washington Common Market Economic Development
Commission and instrumental in bringing Larry Reich to Baltimore.” (Baltimore
Architecture Foundation http://baltimorearchitecture.org/2010/11/03/baltimore-rescued-from-the-interstate-highway-system-i83-i95-i70-in-the-1960s/)
My position on this heated argument is simple; building
roads is fine as long as you have rapid mass transit or a trolley system in
place with green space to offset the etr roads.
CREDIT: HIGHWAYS OF THE FUTURE
Bibliography
Donohue, Nathan. Understanding the Decision to Drop the Bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. august 10, 2012. csis.org/blog/understanding-decision-drop-bomb-hiroshima-and-nagasaki (accessed february 13, 2013).
Kuznick, Oliver Stone and Peter. The Untold History of the Unites States. New York: Gallery Books.
Federation of American Scientistshttp://www.fas.org/nuke/intro/nuke/effects.htm
Baltimore Architecture Foundationhttp://baltimorearchitecture.org/2010/11/03/baltimore-rescued-from-the-interstate-highway-system-i83-i95-i70-in-the-1960s/
